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Wartime Captivity and Colonial Counterinsurgency

Kevin Noles (Independent Scholar)

A question of loyalty: Indian Prisoners-of-War and Australian war-crimes trials of Japanese military personnel after World War Two

Following World War Two, Australian authorities conducted almost a hundred war-crimes trials of Japanese personnel where the victims had been Indian Prisoners-of-War. These prisoners were members of the British Indian Army who had been captured primarily at the surrender of Singapore in February 1942, and who had subsequently been transported to the Southwest Pacific area during the war to act as labourers for Japanese forces. Reviewing the trial records reveals a depressing litany of neglect, abuse, and general cruelty, up to and including execution. A typical defence argument put forward on behalf of Japanese accused in these trials, was that the Indian prisoners had renounced their previous allegiance to the British Indian Army and had agreed to serve with Japanese forces, thereby losing their status as prisoners. Such claims were invariably rejected during the Australian trials. This study reassesses these Japanese claims by utilising British military intelligence information on the conduct of Indian prisoners in captivity, thereby applying this material to the study of the trials for the first time. It focusses on the evidence of the most prominent Indian witness from the Australian trials: Jemadar Chint Singh. One of the few Indian survivors of the appalling conditions that developed in northern New Guinea during the war, Chint Singh subsequently contributed evidence to several trials, including one related to the killing of a Captain Nirpal Chand by several Japanese officers in 1944. It will be argued that the new perspective on the Australian war-crimes trials provided by the British intelligence assessments, suggests that some of the guilty verdicts reached on Japanese defendants were problematic. This outcome resulted from the active suppression of knowledge regarding the behaviour of Indian troops in captivity by British colonial authorities.

Hendrik Willem Nelis (University of Oxford)

A Precursor to Post-War Special Forces Counter-Gangs? A Comparison of Orde Wingate’s Special Night Squads and British Post-War Special Forces Counter-Gang Conduct in Colonial Irregular Warfare and Counterinsurgency

This paper focuses on British counter-gangs and special forces units, particularly considering the Special Night Squads (SNS) of Orde Wingate in the interwar Mandate of Palestine during the Arab Revolt (1936-1939). The SNS were a combined Anglo-Jewish irregular unit used to ambush and pursue Arab guerrillas during the Revolt. This paper examines the extent to which the SNS can be considered a precursor, as is sometimes asserted, to later British counter-gang and special forces units in Kenya and Cyprus in the 1950s and Borneo and Oman in the 1960s and 1970s respectively. Counter-gangs are irregular counterinsurgent units incorporating local auxiliaries and former rebels used to pursue guerrillas through irregular means. A closer examination reveals the connection and similarities between the SNS and its supposed post-war successors to be overstated. Through comparing Wingate’s SNS to these later units from the perspectives of their varying tactical and organisational approaches, use of intelligence, cultural and linguistic knowledge, and varying attitudes to the doctrines of ‘minimum force’ and winning hearts and minds, one can understand the extent to which Wingate’s SNS can be seen as a forerunner for later special forces counter-gangs. On closer examination, despite certain tactical and organisational similarities between the SNS and its post-war counterparts, it becomes increasingly evident that Wingate’s Special Night Squads cannot be seen as a forerunner or a blueprint to post-war British special forces counter-gangs. This seems to debunk the notion of a unique, consistent, unchanging British model of counterinsurgency and, in turn, undermine the notion of static strategic cultures or ways of war. These conclusions also have implications for how we view British imperialism and its methods of colonial control.

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Military Medicine and Imperial Ecology

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November 13

Reading, Writing, and Teaching Global History Now